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Abstract
A problematic feature of the existing empirical literature on the relationship between
revenue decentralization (RD) and inflation is the use of inaccurate measures for RD.
Using a newly constructed measure for RD that accounts for over-time changes in sub-
national tax autonomy, this paper finds that RD leads to lower inflation.
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1 Introduction
There are several reasons why revenue decentralization (RD) could lead to lower inflation
rates. One reason is that RD might increase the effectiveness of revenue collection, thereby
reducing the need for governments to resort to inflation to deal with fiscal problems. A
second reason is that in decentralized countries, the national government might have too
little political power to induce the central bank to pursue inflationary policies.
On the other hand, there are also reasons why RD could lead to higher inflation. One
important one is that RD might complicate policy coordination, resulting in a reduced ability
of the public sector to react to inflationary pressures. Another reason is that price stability
is a type of national public good. If a multitude of governments are responsible for providing
this public good, prices might not be sufficiently stable in equilibrium (Treisman, 2000).
Given that the theoretical link between RD and inflation is ambiguous, an empirical litera-
ture on this question has recently emerged. Early papers by King and Ma (2001) and Neyapti
(2004) found that RD reduces inflation, in particular in countries with independent central
banks and/or traditionally low inflation rates. Thornton (2007), however, questions these
findings. He argues that the King-Ma-Neyapti papers obtain this result only because they
use an inaccurate measure for RD. This is a valid criticism since King-Ma-Neyapti construct
their RD measures by simply dividing sub-national revenues by total government revenues.
It has repeatedly been noted that such RD measures are problematic because they do not
capture the extent of sub-national autonomy over their revenue sources (Rodden, 2004). More
specifically, these measures do not take into account whether sub-national governments re-
ceive their revenues through taxes for which they can autonomously set rates and/or define
bases, or through taxes whose rates and bases are effectively under the control of the central
government. RD, however, is only a meaningful concept if sub-national governments have
autonomous taxing powers.
Thornton (2007) uses a dataset provided by OECD (1999) to revisit the relationship be-
tween RD and inflation. In a nutshell, OECD (1999) classifies sub-national tax revenues in
a given country into three broad categories. The first category are sub-national revenues
2
from taxes over which sub-national governments have significant control, i. e. taxes for which
sub-national governments can either set rates or define bases or both. The second category
are sub-national revenues from shared taxes for which the revenue split is either determined
by sub-national governments or cannot be changed without their consent. The third category
are all other sub-national tax revenues.
The ratio of sub-national tax revenues that fall into the first category to total government
tax revenues arguably represents a more accurate measure of true level of RD in a country
than the RD measures used by King-Ma-Neyapti because it takes the degree of sub-national
tax autonomy into account. OECD (1999) calculates such ratios for 19 OECD countries for
the year 1995. Using this measure of RD, Thornton (2007) analyzes the effect of RD and
inflation in a panel regression study for these 19 OECD countries over the period 1980-2000.
His results suggest, in contrast to the King-Ma-Neyapti papers, that there is no significant
relationship between RD and inflation.
Even though Thornton’s study takes the extent of sub-national tax autonomy into account,
one problem with his RD measure is that it effectively postulates that sub-national tax au-
tonomy has remained constant throughout the sample period in all countries. In this paper,
I address this potentially problematic feature by using new panel data on RD constructed by
Stegarescu (2005). The Stegarescu RD measure follows OECD (1999) and Thornton (2007)
in that it is defined as the share of sub-national revenues from taxes for which sub-national
governments can set rates or define bases to total government tax revenues. But in addition,
the Stegarescu RD measure reflects over-time changes in sub-national tax autonomy. For ex-
ample, when control over a certain tax shifts from the national to sub-national governments,
it captures this change in taxing powers. Therefore, the Stegarescu RD measure represents
an improvement over previously used RD measures.1
1However, the Stegarescu RD measure is not perfect either. For example, it does not control for unfunded
mandates that are imposed by the central government on sub-national governments.
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2 Data and methodology
Since OECD (1999) provides information regarding the extent of sub-national tax autonomy
only for the year 1995, Thornton (2007) constructs what he calls a “reasonable annual time
series proxy for the own-revenues over which sub-national governments have full discretion”
for the 19 countries that are covered by the OECD study. In essence, he rescales a traditional
RD measure, constructed as the share of sub-national revenues in total government revenues,
by the share of sub-national revenues that were obtained from taxes over which sub-national
governments had discretion in 1995.
Hence, Thornton effectively postulates that the extent of sub-national tax autonomy has
remained constant in all 19 countries during the sample period2. As such, Thornton’s RD
measure does not capture changes in sub-national tax autonomy accurately and is likely to
suffer from measurement error. It is well known that estimated coefficients of variables that
are measured with error are biased towards zero when used as covariates in regression models
(Greene, 2003, Ch. 5). Therefore, it is not surprising that Thornton’s regressions indicate
that RD is insignificant.
Figure 1 plots the average change in the share of sub-national to total government tax
revenues against the average change in the Stegarescu measure during the 1980-2000 period
for the 23 countries3 included in the Stegarescu dataset.4 As can be seen in this figure, most
countries are either below or above the line through the origin, which suggests that a measure
of RD whose variability is exclusively due to changes in the share of sub-national to total
government tax revenues tends to underestimate changes in RD.5
2This is clearly a questionable assumption. For example, it is wrong for Spain and Belgium. These countries
have, as a means to assuage separatist tendencies, started to grant significant fiscal autonomy to sub-national
governments during the 1980s. This means that in these two countries, not only the share of sub-national tax
revenues in total tax revenues has increased, but also the extent of sub-national tax autonomy.
3Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States.
4The data source for the share of sub-national to total government tax revenues as defined in this paper is
the OECD’s Revenue Statistics. Note that for several countries, the share of sub-national to total government
tax revenues is lower than the equivalent Stegarescu RD measure. The reason is presumably that the OECD’s
Revenue Statistics classifies by default social security contributions as tax revenues (thereby leading to a greater
denominator for the traditional RD measures) whereas Stegarescu excludes social security contributions from
tax revenues.
5In fact, the Thornton measures will underestimate the true change even more than the traditional RD
measure. To see why, define as RDi,t the share of sub-national in total government tax revenues for country i
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Figure 1: Average annual change in traditional and adjusted RD measures,
1980-2000: Data sources: OECD Revenue Statistics and Stegarescu (2005).
To investigate whether the insignificant effect of RD on inflation found in Thornton’s study
is indeed due to measurement error, I replicate his regressions using the Stegarescu RD mea-
sure. The dataset consists of 23 OECD countries and covers the period 1980-2000. I use
a transformation of the inflation rate6, i. e. p = [inflation rate/(1 + inflation rate)], as the
dependent variable to deal with the fact that some countries have had very large inflation
rates during the sample period, which may unduly influence the estimates. As control vari-
ables, I include government spending as share of GDP7 (GOV ), real GDP growth per capita8
(GROWTH), the sum of export and imports divided by GDP to capture economic openness9
(OPEN), and two measures of monetary policy: the Cukierman index of central bank inde-
pendence10 (CBI) and a dummy variable capturing whether or not a country is characterized
by a fixed exchange rate regime11 (FXfixed).
in year t. Thornton’s measure is constructed as TRD = αRD, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Thus, the change between two
periods in Thornton’s measure is ∆TRD = α∆RD ≤ ∆RD.
6Data source: OECD Key Short-Term Economic Indicators.
7Data source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
8Data source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
9Data source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
10Data source: Cukierman et al. (1992) and Polillo and Guille´n (2005)
11Data source: Sturzenegger and Levi-Yeyati (2005)
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3 Results
Table 1: Panel regressions for inflation with cross-section
fixed effects, 1980-2000
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Constant 1.326*** 1.399*** 1.310*** 1.389*** 1.481*** 1.573***
(0.243) (0.232) (0.244) (0.232) (0.276) (0.261)
RD -0.010* -0.010* -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
RDadj -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
CBI 0.011 0.011
(0.012) (0.012)
GROWTH -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
OPEN -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GOV -0.029 -0.026 -0.029 -0.026 -0.045* -0.037
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
FXfixed -0.079* -0.047
(0.047) (0.047)
R2 0.040 0.062 0.042 0.064 0.049 0.069
RMSE 0.257 0.254 0.257 0.254 0.266 0.263
Cross-sections 23 23 23 23 23 23
Observations 480 480 480 480 422 422
1 Inflation is measured as p = [inflation rate/(1 + inflation rate)]
2 Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***)
3 Standard errors in parentheses
Table 1 presents the regressions results. I report fixed effects regressions using the tradi-
tional RD measure (the share of sub-national to total government tax revenues), labeled RD
in the regression table, and the Stegarescu RD measures that are adjusted for the extent of
sub-national tax autonomy, labeled RDadj .
The results show that while the traditional RD measure displays a negative and in two out
of three regressions a weakly significant coefficient, the estimated coefficient for the Stegarescu
RD measure is always negative and highly significant. These results suggest that when over-
time changes in sub-national tax autonomy are explicitly taken into account, the negative
effect of RD on inflation found in the King-Ma-Neyapti studies is reaffirmed. Consequently,
it appears that the insignificance of the adjusted measure of RD in Thornton’s study was
primarily due to the fact that his adjustment did not accurately reflect changes in sub-national
tax autonomy over time, and not because RD is genuinely insignificant for inflation.
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4 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of RD on inflation using an improved measure of RD that
explicitly takes over-time changes in sub-national tax autonomy into account. The results
show that when such changes are taken into account, RD has a significantly negative effect
on inflation.
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